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Abstract Historical progress of nuclear safety regulations and nuclear safety 
regulatory organizations in Japan in response to the Mutsu nuclear ship accident 
and JCO criticality accident are reviewed. Then the lessons we can learn from 
the “regulatory failures” on nuclear safety uncovered by the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident in 2011 are discussed focusing on the “failure” of interdisciplinary com-
munication for setting up seismic and tsunami standards and the “failure” of vol-
untary safety efforts relating to the scope of sever accident management. After 
analyzing the policy process leading to the institutional reform after the accident 
aiming for independence and integrative capabilities under the newly set up organ-
izational framework of Nuclear Regulatory Authority, remaining issues of current 
nuclear safety regulation in Japan, such as interdisciplinary sensitivity, capability 
of regulatory staff in government nuclear safety regulatory organization, independ-
ent source of expertise relating to nuclear technology in the context of Japan, and 
careers pattern for risk managers are also analyzed.
Keywords Safety regulation · Sever accident management · Independence · 
Integrative capabilities · Interdisciplinary sensitivity · Nuclear reactor regulation 
law · Nuclear Safety Commission · Nuclear and industrial safety agency · 
Nuclear Regulatory Authority
14.1  Introduction
After the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident caused by the Great 
East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, various arguments for the reform of 
nuclear safety regulation were proffered. The government, in addition to setting up 
the Accident Investigation Committee, undertook a parallel process for regulatory 
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reform. As a result, the “Basic Concept of Structural Reform of Nuclear Safety 
Regulations” was adopted at the Cabinet Meeting of August 15, 2011.
It advocated the launch of a new safety regulatory body, on the basis of the prin-
ciple of “separating regulation from utilization.” The nuclear safety regulatory divi-
sions of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) were to be separated from 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; and a “Nuclear Safety and Security 
Agency” would be established by April 2012 as an external agency of the Ministry of 
Environment by integrating into it the functions of the Nuclear Safety Commission 
(NSC). After the negotiation with the opposition party at the time, it was agreed to 
establish Nuclear Regulatory Authority as an independent commission with decision 
making power in June 2012, which was finally set up in September 2012.
In the history of nuclear safety regulations in Japan, major reforms were under-
taken after two accidents: the Mutsu nuclear ship accident of 1974 and the JCO 
criticality accident of 1999. It is important to have a historical perspective to under-
stand what will happen this time. To that end, this chapter will review the historical 
progress of nuclear safety regulation in Japan in response to these two accidents. 
This chapter then discusses the lessons we can learn from the “regulatory failures” 
on nuclear safety uncovered by the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, and about 
the institutional reform and remaining issues of nuclear safety regulation in Japan.
14.2  Historical Progress of Nuclear Safety Regulation  
in Japan
14.2.1  The First Period (1957–1978)
We can classify as the first period the two decades from 1957, when Japan estab-
lished the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel 
Material and Reactors (the Nuclear Reactors Regulation Law), to 1978, when this 
Law was revised.
During this period, the Prime Minister had authority to approve licenses for 
nuclear businesses. Actually, the Director-General of the Science and Technology 
Agency, who was a cabinet member, had regulatory authority through assistance 
to the Prime Minister. As for commercial nuclear power reactors and commercial 
marine reactors, however, administrative measures, including construction per-
mits issued by the Prime Minister, required the consent of the competent ministers 
(Article 71 of the Nuclear Reactors Regulation Law). In this case these were the 
Minister of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Minister of Transport, 
because these reactors had already been regulated by the old Electricity Business 
Act and the Ship Safety Act. In addition, some regulatory approvals and inspec-
tions of these two types of reactors, including approvals of design and construction 
plan, inspections of facilities and their performance, pre-service inspections, and 
periodic inspections, were exempted from the application of the Nuclear Reactors 
Regulation Law and were left to be covered by existing regulations (Article 73).
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Meanwhile, the Nuclear Reactors Regulation Law also stipulated that the 
Prime Minister should listen to and respect the opinion of the Atomic Energy 
Commission of Japan (JAEC), which was established under the Prime Minister’s 
Office based on Article 8 of the National Government Organization Act, includ-
ing matters concerning safety regulation (Paragraph 2, Article 4). The Director-
General of the Science and Technology Agency took on the position of chair 
person of the JAEC and this agency dealt with the staff work of the Commission. 
There had been controversy as to whether the JAEC should be set up as an 
organization prescribed in Article 3 or Article 8 of the National Government 
Organization Act, as the former is a decision-making organ and the latter is an 
advisory one. In the end, the JAEC was established as a de facto decision-making 
organ despite its legal nature as a very strong advisory council [1].
In this first period, one administrative agency—legally the Prime Minister, 
but actually the Science and Technology Agency—had nearly exclusively imple-
mented nuclear safety regulation, even though some approvals were required by 
relevant ministries. Additionally, the JAEC had been established as a highly inde-
pendent advisory council whose members were appointed upon confirmation from 
both Houses of the Diet. It was thought that the reason the JAEC had been granted 
a great deal of independence was so that it could ensure peaceful use of nuclear 
energy, as the purpose of its establishment was to provide “democratic administra-
tion of public affairs” (Article 4 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law and Article 1 of 
the Act for Establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission).
14.2.2  The Second Period (1978–1999)
The 1974 radiation leakage accident of Mutsu, the first and the only nuclear-
powered ship in Japan, aroused public mistrust in the Japanese nuclear adminis-
tration as a whole. The Japanese government established the Advisory Committee 
on Atomic Energy Administration under the Prime Minister in February 1975, 
whose chairman was Hiromi Arisawa, Emeritus Professor of the University of 
Tokyo, to reexamine the institution of nuclear-related organizations. Based on the 
Committee’s report, the Nuclear Reactors Regulation Law was revised in 1978. 
We can regard as the second period the twenty years from that time to 1999 when 
the JCO criticality accident occurred, and the nuclear regulatory institution was 
reformed as a result of the reorganization of the central government.
The Arisawa Advisory Committee submitted its report in July 1976 detailing 
its recommendations on the reform and enhancement of nuclear administration in 
Japan. Three assertions closely linked with nuclear safety regulation were pointed 
out in this report as follows:
•	 To separate the functions related to nuclear safety from those of the JAEC, and 
to establish a new committee which shall deal with nuclear safety and double-
check the safety reviews by the administrative agencies for enhancing the insti-
tutional framework of securing nuclear safety;
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•	 To implement safety regulations consistently according to the types of reactors 
to clarify the responsibility of administrative agencies for ensuring the safety 
of nuclear reactors—the Minister of MITI be responsible for the regulation of 
commercial nuclear power reactors, the Minister of Transport for those of com-
mercial marine reactors, and the Prime Minister for those of research and test 
reactors and those in the stage of research and development; and
•	 To implement some government measures such as holding public hearings and 
symposia to dispel the public’s concerns over nuclear safety and obtain the pub-
lic’s understanding and cooperation on nuclear energy development [2].
Based on these recommendations, the Nuclear Reactors Regulation Law was 
revised in 1978 as described below. First, this revision assured consistency of 
safety regulations with respect to each type of reactor for ensuring their safety as 
follows: commercial nuclear power reactors would be regulated by the Minister 
of MITI, commercial marine reactors by the Minister of Transport, and research 
and test reactors and those in the stage of research and development by the Prime 
Minister. Next, the functions relevant to safety were separated from the JAEC and 
the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC) was newly established to exer-
cise jurisdiction over nuclear safety issues. Still, the legal position of the NSC 
fell under the category of “Councils, etc.” prescribed in Article 8 of the National 
Administrative Organization Act as did that of the JAEC. As a result of this 
reform, the competent ministers were required to listen to and respect the opinions 
of the NSC about safety-related issues when they designated activities and issued 
permits; and the NSC stated its opinion in the form of double-checking safety 
reviews of the competent ministers on nuclear regulation. Meanwhile, neither the 
NSC nor the JAEC had its own secretariat, so the Science and Technology Agency 
dealt with the staff work of both Commissions.
With regard to the institutional form of the NSC and that of the JAEC whose 
reform was also re-examined at that time, the controversy as to whether an Article 
3 organ or an Article 8 organ was adequate was rekindled. The Arisawa Committee 
concluded that the NSC and the JAEC should be “advisory committees” although 
the Socialist Party of Japan, the Japanese Communist Party, and the Federation 
of Electric Power Related Industry Workers’ Unions of Japan proposed changing 
these institutional forms to “administrative committees” which have executive 
authority, such as the Japan Fair Trade Commission. The Arisawa Committee pro-
vided two reasons to support its conclusion as follows:
•	 Under the form of administrative committee, the JAEC and the NSC could not 
sufficiently perform their role as “the guardian of the Atomic Energy Basic 
Law” and would lose their ability to monitor the government because to become 
administrative committees meant being part of the government.
•	 The primary need was to secure the autonomy of both committees from the 
government from the viewpoint of ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
which was the starting point for Japan’s nuclear energy development [3].
In addition to these considerations, the problem of the scope of authority was 
taken into account. That is, administrative committees could not deal with any 
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issues other than their own administrative affairs authorized clearly by law. That 
meant there was the possibility that they would not be able to cover all the safety-
related issues unless the laws prescribed the scope of authority very broadly; and 
that making a broad stipulation could overlap with the authority of other govern-
mental agencies [4].
Furthermore, two public hearings would need to be held during the siting pro-
cess of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Primary public hearings were held by MITI 
concerning various issues related to construction of NPPs before the Electric 
Power Development Coordination Council (so-called “Den-Chō-Shin”) decided 
the Electric Power Development Master Plan for building new commercial nuclear 
power reactors. And secondary public hearings would be held by the NSC on the 
occasion of double-checking safety review documents submitted by MITI [2].
In this second period, the regulatory authorities were decentralized. What is 
more, several governmental agencies, including the ministries which had held 
jurisdiction over the development and promotion of nuclear businesses, also regu-
lated nuclear safety according to the types of business. This was because the cen-
tralized regime of safety regulation in the first period had been judged not to work 
adequately. However, it can be said that these changes strengthened the integra-
tion inside each type of business, which meant the level of integration between 
the promotion side and the regulation side was enhanced. In addition, the highly 
independent advisory committee became responsible for the preliminary review of 
regulation by the regulatory agencies.
14.2.3  The Third Period (Since 1999)
The JCO (a nuclear fuel production company) criticality accident of September 1999 
killed two workers, the first victims in the history of nuclear energy development in 
Japan, and caused radiation release which forced the evacuation of nearby residents. 
The report of the “Investigation Committee on the Criticality Accident at Uranium 
Processing Plant” proposed some measures related to regulatory issues as follows:
•	 Strengthening and enhancement of the capacities of regulatory agencies;
•	 Strengthening the independence of the NSC and the capacities of the NSC sec-
retariat and ensuring input from expert groups in a variety of fields;
•	 Improving regulatory guides and making the multi-layered and mutually com-
plementary regime of safety regulation function more effectively; and
•	 Enhancing the regulatory agency’s and the NSC’s responses to demands from soci-
ety and the requirements of the present age, and improving their self-inspection.
The NSC in response to this report formulated its directions for ensuring nuclear 
safety in the Basic Policies for the Near-Term Initiatives of the NSC (NSC 
Decision in November 1999) as follows:
•	 To devote more attention to the viewpoint of operation management in the 
safety review of basic designs by adding experts in this field; and
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•	 To verify the conditions in the operation stage as to whether the operators are 
maintaining their technical capabilities and taking appropriate safety meas-
ures. To assure that safety concepts are being followed at the time of the safety 
review, by receiving reports from the regulatory agencies on the compliance 
status of operational safety programs on the implementation status of periodic 
inspections and by conducting on-site inspections by the NSC itself.
The secretariat of the NSC was transferred from the Nuclear Safety Bureau of the 
Science and Technology Agency to the Prime Minister’s Office in April 2000. This 
change brought about enhancement of human resources and improvement of the 
secretariat’s capability to conduct expert investigations through such means as 
assigning experts from a wide range of areas as technical advisors, although it was 
a transitional institution until it was shifted to the Cabinet Office in 2001. In addi-
tion, the NSC institutionalized “the subsequent regulation review” of post-license 
regulations, which meant those regulations covering post-approval installation for 
nuclear facilities, including verification by on-site inspection for confirming the 
status of implementation of safety measures at construction and operation stages. 
The NSC published “The Basic Policies for the Near-Term Initiative of the NSC” 
(NSC Decision of June 2000) based on some trial implementations. Since then, the 
NSC began to implement fully the subsequent regulation review.
At the beginning of November 1999, there was a movement by the 
Administrative Reform Task Force of the Liberal Democratic Party to strengthen 
the NSC as an organization prescribed in Article 3 of the National Government 
Organization Act [5], but this was not put into action.
Furthermore, due to the reorganization of central government ministries, the regu-
lation of commercial power reactors, reactors at the stage of research and develop-
ment, and nuclear fuel facilities, etc. had come under the jurisdiction of the Minister 
of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). However, the regulation 
of commercial marine reactors was placed under the jurisdiction of the Minister of 
Land, Infrastructure and Transportation from the Minister of Transport, and that 
of test and research reactors under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) from the Prime Minister (substan-
tially from the Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency). In accord-
ance with the abolishment of the Prime Minister’s Office and the establishment of 
the Cabinet Office, the JAEC and the NSC had come under the Cabinet Office, and 
the NSC had come to have its independent secretariat in the Cabinet Office.
Also, organizations inside METI were restructured at that time. The Nuclear 
and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) was newly established as an organization 
under METI—its legal position is a “Special Organ” attached to the Agency for 
Natural Resources and Energy. The purpose of this reform was to clarify the mis-
sion and responsibility of the agency in charge of nuclear safety administration, 
while ensuring independence to some extent, although it was still under METI [6].
It can be said that this government reorganization gave NSC greater independ-
ence because it was transferred to the Cabinet Office which has a higher position 
than the other Ministries, whereas previously it had been under the Prime Minister’s 
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Office which was at the same level as the other Ministries, and the NSC had come 
to have its own secretariat. However, the original stipulation of “respect for deci-
sions” prescribed in Article 3 of the Act for Establishment of the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission was deleted in the revision in 
1999, although the same sentence had been transferred to Article 23 in the revision 
in 1978 at the beginning of the second period. It would seem that the administrative 
reform had got rid of the provision of respecting the decisions of advisory councils 
without exception.
The NSC’s involvement in post-license regulations was institutionalized as “the 
Subsequent Regulation Reviews (SRR)” in the third period in response to the JCO 
criticality accident, after its embryonic stage in the second period. Since then, the 
SSR has been implemented and advanced in response to various incidents. On 
October 29, 2002, for the first time since its establishment in 1978, the NSC sub-
mitted to the Minister of METI through the Prime Minister, “Recommendations 
for Restoring the Confidence of Nuclear Safety” based on Article 24 of the Act 
for Establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety 
Commission in response to Tokyo Electric Power Company’s misconduct in con-
cealing and falsifying inspection records. In addition, the regulatory agencies were 
required periodically to inform the NSC of the status of implementation of subse-
quent regulations since the amendment of the Nuclear Reactors Regulation Law 
in 2002 (Paragraph 3, Article 72). Moreover, this law amendment required the 
nuclear operators and their maintenance and inspection subcontractors to cooper-
ate with the NSC’s inspection in response to reports from the regulatory agencies.
On March 3, 2003 the NSC established new “Subsequent Regulation Review 
Implementation Guidelines” reflecting a stronger monitoring and oversight func-
tion for the subsequent regulations. This guideline set the performance goal of the 
SSR as “to clarify the responsibility of government and operators” for prompting 
the regulatory bodies to develop the continuous upgrading of quality, effective-
ness, and transparency of post-license regulation activities [7].
14.3  Two Regulatory “Failures”—Systemic Causes of the 
Fukushima Daiichi Accident
The Fukushima nuclear accident reveals two “failures” of nuclear safety regulation 
in Japan.
14.3.1  “Failure” of Interdisciplinary Communication
First is the “failure” of interdisciplinary communication. The Fukushima Daiichi 
accident has made it clear that there was a severe delay in implementing tsunami 
counter measures. Why, then, could Japan not succeed in applying necessary 
measures against tsunamis?
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In Japan, there had been a delay in taking actions to deal not only with tsu-
namis but also with seismic risks. However, the first decade of this century saw 
some progress in earthquake countermeasures. In September 2006, the Nuclear 
Safety Commission in Japan (NSC) revised the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing 
Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities in accordance with the results 
of the 5 year study by the Subcommittee for the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing 
Seismic Design, which was established under the NSC in July 2001. With this 
revision, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) instructed nuclear 
operators to evaluate the seismic safety of existing nuclear facilities (so-called 
“back-checks”) and reviewed its findings. In addition, the Chūetsu-oki Earthquake 
of July 2007, which shook the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant with 
maximum seismic accelerations exceeding the levels assumed in the design, had 
made such efforts more imperative.
These processes, however, had not gone smoothly. In particular, there was a 
communication gap between the expert community on nuclear reactor safety, 
which consisted mainly of those in the engineering field, and that of earthquake 
resistance, which was made up of those in the scientific field.
As to the tsunami measures, Japan has responded in incremental ways. For 
example, the Tsunami Evaluation Subcommittee of the Japan Society of Civil 
Engineers (JSCE) published its “Tsunami Assessment Method for Nuclear Power 
Plants in Japan” in February 2002. The basic concept of this assessment method 
was to evaluate the design water level based on analysis of records of historical 
tsunamis and on some calculations with parameter variations. All the power com-
panies which had nuclear power plants in Japan devised voluntary countermeas-
ures against tsunamis based on this assessment method.
However, the Japanese nuclear community was unable to incorporate the rapid 
scientific progress in understanding tsunamis. For instance, in August 2002, the 
Earthquake Research Committee of the Headquarters for Earthquake Research 
Promotion, led mainly by scientific researchers, pointed out the possibility of earth-
quakes centered in plate boundary ocean areas which can be stronger than historical 
earthquakes. In addition, new simulation methods combined with sedimentologi-
cal studies brought some new findings on the Jōgan earthquake of 869 mentioned 
in reliable historical records. Based on these findings, some tsunami experts esti-
mated possible tsunami levels in the Fukushima coastal area higher than earlier pre-
dictions. Such advances in tsunami research have made the uncertainty of tsunami 
prediction more evident among the tsunami experts’ community. Nevertheless, their 
recognition of this uncertainty was not transmitted to the nuclear safety community.
Moreover, in the Revised Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of 
Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities mentioned above, tsunamis are treated as part 
of the “accompanying phenomena” of earthquakes despite some subcommittee 
members’ claim that tsunamis required particular attention in the revision process. 
The revised guide has only ambiguous stipulations about tsunamis as follows: 
“Safety functions of the Facilities shall not be significantly impaired by tsunami 
which could be reasonably postulated to hit in a very low probability in the service 
period of the Facilities.”
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Having taken some measures to counter seismic risks, the nuclear safety com-
munity was placing importance on tsunami risks as well. To cite a case, the Japanese 
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), one of the technical support organiza-
tions in Japan, released study results of a tsunami probabilistic safety assessment 
(PSA) in December 2010 just before the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This study 
shows that tsunami levels above a certain height cause a high incidence of reactor core 
melt. However, these study results were not relayed to the regulatory body, NISA.
We can see from the above that insufficient interdisciplinary communication is one 
of the background factors in the delay in taking actions against tsunami risks. When 
utilizing a complex technology system such as nuclear technology, we are required 
to develop awareness of trends in a broad range of fields of knowledge. Nevertheless, 
we would have to say that institutions in Japan lacks a refined “antenna” which can 
constantly detect recent findings in different expert communities. It can be said that 
this is one of the fundamental functions expected of the regulatory body.
14.3.2  “Failure” of Voluntary Safety Efforts
Second is the “failure” of voluntary safety efforts by private nuclear utilities. 
Nuclear safety regulation in Japan has had a tendency toward relying heavily on 
operators’ voluntary safety efforts. The current institutional design, where NISA is 
located under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), has been well 
adapted to such attributes of regulation.
Though belatedly, Japan introduced its system for severe accident management 
in 1992. However, under the regulatory scheme of voluntary safety efforts, accident 
management measures were basically regarded as voluntary efforts to be made by 
operators, not legal requirements. Moreover, in Japan, it was decided in keeping 
with the intention of operators that the PSA(Probability Safety Assessment), which 
provides the basis for accident management, limit its scope to internal events, and 
exclude external events including earthquakes. These reflected operators’ concerns 
on gaining public acceptance in siting areas as well as technical challenges involved 
in evaluations of external events.
Voluntary measures for severe accident management, however, became subject 
to informal evaluation by the regulatory body in the periodic safety review (PSR), 
which is one of the quality assurance activities taken up by operators voluntarily 
every 10 years. Through this informal evaluation, severe accident management had 
gradually expanded its scope to include external events such as fires. We might say 
that such voluntary safety efforts were effective to a certain extent.
However, when NISA made the PSR obligatory as a requirement of operational 
safety regulations after some scandals involving TEPCO’s cover-ups of cracks in 
shrouds in 2002, NISA left the PSA-related matters as voluntary requirements 
because of insufficient technical expertise to conduct PSAs. As a result, NISA no 
longer evaluated severe accident management informally, and the expansion of the 
scope of the PSA was halted. This can be regarded as an adverse effect of institu-
tionalizing voluntary safety efforts.
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Operators had taken voluntary measures against tsunami risks as well. It was 
the electricity industry that supported a series of studies by JSCE on tsunami 
assessment technologies as mentioned above. Power companies also showed their 
concern about the new simulation studies on the Jōgan tsunami, and tried to seek 
countermeasures by making contact with researchers on this project.
In the end, such voluntary efforts were too slow to prevent this accident caused 
by the earthquake and tsunami. In addition, the delay in accident responses is 
assumed to be due also to the circumstance that it was hard for the operator to vent 
voluntarily without the government’s involvement. Considering these points, we 
must conclude that there have been some real limitations in the conventional meth-
ods of voluntary safety efforts.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the official regulation system by the 
regulatory body would be completely effective. As for the responses to tsunami risks, 
it was not the electricity industry but the regulatory body that should have commis-
sioned the studies on tsunami assessment technologies by JSCE. The regulatory body 
has given less attention to recent findings in related fields than operators have.
14.4  Requirements for New Regulatory System
Based on the lessons from these “failures,” what lesson we can learn to reform 
nuclear safety regulation?
14.4.1  Strengthening Independence
First, many argued the necessity of strengthening the independence of the nuclear 
regulatory authority body. If one of the causes of this accident was the regulatory 
authority’s attitude of leaving voluntary safety efforts up to industry, this argument 
stands to reason. In addition, as long as this accident and the responses to it have 
undermined confidence in the regulatory bodies, to secure their independence is a 
necessary requirement for rebuilding public confidence.
In the past, when the radiation leakage incident of the atomic-powered ship Mutsu 
in September 1974 increased the public’s mistrust, the institutional design of the 
atomic energy administration was put on review. As a result, the NSC was established 
in 1978 and the so-called “double-check” system was institutionalized in Japan: 
direct regulation of nuclear operators by the government regulatory agencies (the for-
mer Ministry of International Trade and Industry, etc.), and supervision/auditing of 
those agencies by the NSC for ensuring highly credible nuclear safety. In January 
2001, NISA was newly established under METI as a “Special Organ” attached to the 
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy in response to the JCO criticality accident 
of September 1999. With this reform, the primary regulatory agency for nuclear safety 
secured “some” degree of independence from the Agency for Natural Recouces and 
Energy, which is also charged with promoting peaceful utilization of nuclear power.
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These attempts at securing the independence of nuclear safety regulatory bodies, 
however, have coexisted with tendencies to depend on operators’ voluntary safety 
efforts and to enhance collaboration and coordination with operators. These estab-
lished ways had some merits, such as flexibility and regulatory cost savings. Still, in 
the case of crisis management of severe accidents like the Fukushima Daiichi acci-
dent, such institutions for nuclear safety regulation clearly caused delays in taking 
actions due to the unclear division of roles between operators and regulatory bodies.
Nuclear Regulatory Authority established as an independent commission with 
decision making power in 2012 at least satisfied this requirement of independence.
14.4.2  Ensuring Integrative Capabilities
Second, some claim that it is essential for the regulatory body to ensure integrative 
capabilities around nuclear safety. They state that although independence is impor-
tant for the regulatory body, what is required is not only institutional independ-
ence but also integrative expertise to ensure substantive autonomy. In fact, we can 
say that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has integrative exper-
tise which exercises jurisdiction comprehensively over nuclear safety, security, and 
safeguards for non-proliferation and has a staff of some 3,000. Similarly in France, 
L’Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) keeps those three areas under control in a 
comprehensive manner.
Of course, ensuring capabilities in nuclear safety regulation has been consist-
ently an important issue in Japan too. Actually, after the JCO criticality accident 
and the reorganization of government ministries under the Hashimoto administra-
tive reforms, NISA had been reinforced and JNES was established under NISA 
in 2003 with several functions transferred from some public-interest corporations. 
These regulatory agencies have been conducting mid-career recruitment from 
manufacturers in order to acquire technical expertise. Furthermore, NSC strength-
ened its secretariat functions after the JCO accident.
Despite these efforts, NISA, JNES and NSC have been facing the common 
challenge of human resource development. The mid-career staffs from manufac-
turers were certainly experts of parts of nuclear technology, but they could not 
always succeed in regulating in a comprehensive way, nor could they acquire 
enough skills as regulatory professionals to deal with operators.
In addition to these issues, there is also a problem with the adequacy of dis-
tribution of regulatory resources, that is, whether it is truly effective to establish 
two sets of regulatory bodies with the limited resources available after the series 
of administrative reforms: NISA and JNES primarily in charge of safety regula-
tion; and NSC which conducts “double-checks.” Moreover, the radiation dose reg-
ulation and the safeguard, the former which sets the overall goal of nuclear safety 
regulation and the latter which is essential for non-proliferation, are both under 
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). 
This means that the authorities related to nuclear safety in its broad sense have 
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been widely dispersed (refer to the Table 14.1 for the numbers in each organiza-
tion). The dispersion of regulatory agencies led to the situation in which the chief 
Cabinet secretary had no choice but to constantly be the point person explaining 
the changing circumstances right after the outbreak of the Fukushima Daiichi acci-
dent even though he was not an expert in any nuclear field.
Under these circumstances, it is considered necessary to establish a consoli-
dated regulatory authority for nuclear safety and to utilize human resources in an 
integrated manner for the efficient development of regulatory capabilities and for 
nurturing experts’ careers.
Nuclear Regulatory Authority having jurisdiction over security and safeguard 
in addition to safety, and absorbing JNES, basically satisfied the requirement of 
integration.
14.5  Future Challenges
The requirements of institutional reform mentioned above are consistent with 
basically with the design idea of NRA, which was finally established in 2012. 
However, there are still some doubts about whether this institutional reform can be 
solutions to the “failures.”
First, we can point to the problem of whether the integration of regulatory bod-
ies can develop an interdisciplinary sensitivity. It is certainly significant to inte-
grate nuclear safety, security, and radiation regulations into a comprehensive 
regulatory system. In addition, this can be a prerequisite for legislating severe 
accident management to make radiation regulation a goal of the overall safety 
Table 14.1  Dispersion 
of regulatory agencies/
institutions
Note *1: Direct employee; *2: Including indirect employee/
management; *3: Unclear
Organization Number
1 NSC 100 *2
2 NISA 330 *3
3 JNES 450 *2
4 AIST 35 *1
5 Nuclear Safety Association 80 *2
6 MEXT Policy Bureau 75 *1
7 MEXT R&D Bureau—safeguard 40 *1
8 JAEA 200 *1
9 Nuclear Safety Tech Center 150 *3
10 Sec of Radiation Council 5 *2
11 Japan Radioisotope Association 20 *1
12 National Inst of Radiological Sciences 50 *1
13 Nuclear Material Management Center 165 *2
Total 1700
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regulations and to change the legislative purpose of safety regulations from “(to 
ensure public safety by) preventing hazards” to “preventing radiation damage to 
the public.” Moreover, some measures for nuclear safety and nuclear security can 
overlap considerably, particularly in the thermal management of spent fuels and 
in the distributed arrangement of emergency diesel generators. Furthermore, broad 
experience in various aspects of nuclear safety fields can be useful in order for 
regulatory officials to develop interdisciplinary communication skills.
However, as noted earlier, one of the “failures” revealed by the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident is the lack of awareness of seismic and tsunami risks. Those risks 
and volcano risks, which seem to be among the future challenges of nuclear safety, 
are risks dealt with under different jurisdictions. Thus, attention must be focused 
on how to develop awareness of issues beyond the jurisdiction of the integrated 
regulatory authority and how to ensure interdisciplinary communication among 
such segmented fields.
The second problem, as made clear by the Fukushima Daiichi accident, is the 
limitation of voluntary safety efforts, and whether it is truly possible for the inte-
grated regulatory body to strengthen the capability of regulatory staff in govern-
ment nuclear safety regulatory organization. That entails the need for ensuring its 
capabilities independent of operators.
In the case of the United States, the Navy, which has many nuclear subma-
rines, has played an important role as an excellent source of nuclear professionals 
other than power companies. In fact, many nuclear experts from the Navy have 
been employed by the NRC and the secretariat of the Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations (INPO), which is a self-regulating organization of nuclear operators. 
In Japan, it can be said that some research institutes under the former Science and 
Technology Agency, such as the former Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute 
(JAERI), have played a role somewhat similar to the U.S. Navy. However, these 
institutes have had a tendency to downsize their operations as Japanese science 
and technology policy places more emphasis on research studies that have high 
possibilities to be applied to meet societal needs.
In Japan, assuring the careers of risk managers who have an interdisciplinary 
orientation based on various experiences of risk management in different fields, 
could be the key to ensuring continuous availability of human resources with capa-
bilities in nuclear safety regulation but with sufficient independence from opera-
tors in nuclear fields.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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